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THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN BY THE NUMBERS:  
JUST HOW GREAT WAS “THE GREAT DISSENTER?” 
 
by 
 
Gabriel J. Chin* 
 
 
During the centennial year of Justice John Marshall Harlan’s most famous opinion, 
the remarkable dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,1 an article in the Iowa Law Review2 
suggested that Harlan was not a modern liberal on race issues.  Rather than being a 
Brennan or Marshall with muttonchop sideburns and button shoes, the article argued 
that Harlan was a distinctly transitional figure, better than his brethren in some ways, 
but afflicted with significant blind spots.  In particular, Harlan criticized the Chinese in 
his celebrated Plessy dissent itself.  He contended that “[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind”3 and insisted that government should guarantee “equality before the law of all 
citizens of the United States, without regard to race.”4 But then he observed: 
 
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it 
to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few 
exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country.  I allude to the Chinese race.  But 
by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with 
white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race [cannot] . . . . 5  
 
The article also noted that Harlan had voted against Chinese litigants in other important 
cases.6  The point was not simply to trash Harlan, but to suggest that Harlan’s 
reputation has been “whitewashed” by scholars and courts who ignored the 
complexities of Harlan’s words and voting record.7  Specifically, while Harlan can be 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.  B.A., Wesleyan; 
J.D., Michigan; LL.M., Yale.  E-mail: gchin@aya.yale.edu.  A version of this paper was 
presented as the First Annual Charles R. Grant Lecture at the University of Akron, C. Blake 
McDowell Law Center in February, 1999; the students and faculty present offered many 
helpful suggestions for improvement.  I am grateful for the comments and other assistance of 
Taunya Banks, Sarah Chin, Bruce Ching, Paul Finkelman, James Gardner, Brian Heath, Donna 
Nagy, Michael Solimine and Louise Weinberg. 
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
2 Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
151 (1996).  
3 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
4 Id. at 560. 
5 Id. at 561. 
6 See Chin, supra  note 2, at 157-66.  
7 See id. at 166-71.  The article reported that the main constitutional law casebooks omitted 
the troublesome portion of the Plessy opinion.  As the article was going to press, a new 
edition of one of those casebooks was published which included the language and a 
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credited with being uniquely supportive of African American civil rights, he was not a 
modern anti-racist because he did not object to racial discrimination against Chinese.  
Although Harlan may be of substantial historical interest, neither supporters of 
affirmative action like Laurence Tribe, Charles Lawrence, Cass Sunstein, and Kathleen 
Sullivan nor opponents like Charles Fried, William Bennett, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy should invoke Harlan’s views as a contemporary 
model for racial justice.8 
 
Harlan’s reputation does not seem to have suffered as a result of the critique.  
Justice Harlan’s special authority continues to be invoked by state and federal courts,9 
and Harlan himself remains the subject of intense scholarly attention.10  Of particular 
note was one scholar’s suggestion that the argument was unfair to Justice Harlan.  
                                                                                                                         
discussion of its import.  See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS SUNSTEIN & 
MARK TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114-15 (3d ed. 1996). 
8 Chin, supra  note 2, at 152-54 (citing sources where each named scholar or judge relies on 
Plessy dissent). 
9  One judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals invoked Harlan’s example in support of 
his own decision to write separately:  “It took 58 years to be persuasive, but his place in 
history is secure.  We know his name.  Without looking it up, name me all the majority writers 
in Plessy.  Name me three? Name me one?” Granite Valley Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Jackpot 
Junction Bingo and Casino, 559 N.W.2d 135, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).  See also, e.g., Ho v. 
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 862 (9th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Virginia 
Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 678 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Plessy dissent in case 
invalidating pay equity plan for female professors who were paid less as a group than male 
professors); Coalition to Save our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 752, 780 (3d Cir. 
1996) (Sarokin, J., dissenting); Quilter v. Voinovich, 981 F. Supp. 1032, 1055-56 (N.D. Ohio 
1997) (three judge court), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 1358 (1998); Price v. Short, 931 S.W.2d 677, 684 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Plessy dissent in support of proposition that race-based 
peremptory challenges against members of any race were illegal; affirming judgment of judge 
named John Marshall); Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376, 390-91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) 
(Randall, J., dissenting) (citing Plessy dissent in argument challenging Indian sovereignty), 
aff’d, 561 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. 1997).  
10 See, e.g., Molly Townes O’Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy 
Dissenter’s Color-Blind Constitution,  6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753 (1998);  Theolious 
Johnson, Paradigms, Oxymorons and Color Blindness: Rethinking Black Entrepreneurship 
in the Specter of Plessy, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 301 (1997); Damon Keith, One Hundred Years after 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 853 (1997); Brook Thomas, Plessy v. Ferguson and the 
Literary Imagination, 9 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 45 (1997); Mark Tushnet, Plessy v. 
Ferguson in Libertarian Perspective, 16 L. & PHIL. 245 (1997).  Books about Harlan also 
continue to appear; for example, the University of North Carolina Press is soon to publish an 
important new study authored by University of Cincinnati historian Linda Przybyszewski.  
See LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1999); see 
also  Linda C.A. Przybyszewski, Mrs. John Marshall Harlan’s Memories: Hierarchies of 
Gender and Race in the Household and the Polity, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 453 (1993). 
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Professor Louise Weinberg, William B. Bates Chair for the Administration of Justice at 
the University of Texas School of Law, writing in the Michigan Law Review,11 
demanded a closer analysis.  In her essay, Holmes’ Failure, she argued that Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes was “a failure”12 in that he “became only a minor figure in the 
intellectual history of the common law, and failed to become an actor in the unfolding 
story of the common law itself.  [With the exception of his First Amendment 
jurisprudence], Holmes was almost wholly irrelevant.”13 
 
Professor Weinberg perceptively and effectively criticized Holmes, but defended 
Harlan.  “I find little support,”  she wrote, for the “argument that the first Justice 
Harlan’s decency in civil rights cases did not extend to the civil rights of Chinese 
Americans.”14  While acknowledging that “Justice Harlan apparently shared Chief 
Justice Fuller’s view that the Chinese were ‘remaining strangers in the land, residing 
apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own 
country, unfamiliar with our institutions and apparently incapable of assimilating with 
our people . . . .’ United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 731 (1898) (Fuller, 
C.J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting),”15  Professor Weinberg insisted that “Harlan 
struggled to secure the rights of Chinese immigrants.  See, e.g., Chew Heong v. United 
States, 112 U.S. 536, 560 (1884) (Harlan, J.) (interpreting the Chinese Exclusion Acts 
as consistent with preexisting treaty obligations, thus enabling a Chinese laborer to 
return to this country).”16   
 
How can Professor Weinberg’s claim be answered?  Citation of a single case in 
which Harlan wrote for a majority in favor of an Asian litigant hardly suggests that 
Harlan “struggled to secure the rights of Chinese immigrants.”  After all, just as a 
stopped clock is right twice a day, even at its worst, the Supreme Court did not reject 
each and every claim advanced by racial minorities and other disfavored groups.  But if 
her citation of a single case does not end the issue, neither did citation of a small 
number of cases; the article cited biased words written by Harlan, including some from 
his Plessy dissent itself, but a few cracks alone, especially from the last century, are not 
conclusive proof of bias.  For example, if it could be shown that Harlan had used racial 
slurs or engaged in stereotyping with respect to African Americans, that would not 
undermine the fact that he was better than his colleagues on the Court; that he was not 
perfect with respect to an issue does not mean he was not good.  Implicitly, Professor 
Weinberg asked for a defense of the article’s claims about Harlan’s jurisprudence which 
more systematically accounted for Harlan’s voting record as a whole.  This essay will 
attempt to do that. 
                                                 
11 Louise Weinberg, Holmes’ Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691 (1997). 
12 Id. at 692. 
13 Id. at 722 (criticizing Chin, supra  note 2). 
14 Id. at 709 n.72.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
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There may be no definitive scientific, quantifiable method of judicial evaluation.  
Evaluation of a judge’s record necessarily involves a measure of subjectivity.  
Nevertheless, even a subjective analysis can marshal and present evidence more 
persuasively or less so.  This essay proposes to defend the conclusion reached in the 
Iowa article using three categories of evidence.  
 
The first category of evidence, and one which the Iowa article totally ignored, is 
Harlan’s voting record as a whole compared to the Court.  It is difficult to draw 
conclusions from a single case, even a singularly important case like Dred Scott or 
Plessy.  In any given ruling, any given judge may feel duty-bound to come out a 
particular way, perhaps a way which is inconsistent with his or her personal political 
beliefs.  At the same time, it has been a truism since the days of the realists that within 
the system of precedent many cases could be decided either way.17  Thus, it is relevant 
to examine how Harlan voted in the broad run of cases dealing with civil rights claims 
advanced by Asian litigants, and to compare that record to his votes in the civil rights 
cases involving African Americans, where his reputation as a racial progressive was 
earned.  
 
The second kind of evidence that is relevant to the evaluation of Harlan’s judicial 
record is evidence of intent or motive; statements of reasons for votes or attitudes.  For 
example, surely Harlan’s Plessy dissent would not be as celebrated as it is if it had been 
based solely on an argument that the Court had no jurisdiction because the notice of 
appeal had been filed out of time; the merit of his opinion rests on its advanced 
understanding of the equal protection clause.  
 
Finally, leading cases warrant special attention.  An example is Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Plessy which was a vote that the Jim Crow system was unconstitutional.  
Therefore, that vote might be regarded as much more significant than his vote in 
Cumming v. Board of Education18 upholding a school district’s decision to offer high 
school educations to whites only.  By the time he wrote Cumming, Harlan’s anti-
segregation position had already lost in Plessy, and it is not entirely fair to criticize a 
judge for applying a rule he was on record as opposing.19  On the other hand, twenty 
votes holding schools or public facilities separate and unequal on the facts might not 
outweigh a single vote in favor of the institution of separate but equal in the first place. 
 
Considering these kinds of evidence together may offer an informed picture of a 
judge’s disposition.  By these measures, Harlan cannot be regarded as a defender of 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 
710-13 (1998). 
18  175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
19 Id. at 543-44 (noting that no challenge to segregation “was made in the pleadings . . . 
[w]e must dispose of this case as it is presented by the record.”). 
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Asian civil rights.  Based on his voting record, he was the most ardent defender of 
African American civil rights.  By contrast, his record in Asian cases was one of the 
worst.  His votes in favor of African American civil rights were in critical cases.  In 
most of the critical cases with respect to Asian litigants, he voted against them. 
 
I. COUNTING CASES: AN ARITHMETICAL ANALYSIS OF HARLAN’S SUPPORT FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS 
 
In order to assess whether Harlan’s concern for civil rights extended to Asian 
Americans, two groups of cases were assembled and examined.20  The first group 
consists of cases decided during Harlan’s long service on the Court (1877-1911) which 
involved statutory or constitutional civil rights claims by or on behalf of African 
Americans.21  Typical examples of these cases involved African Americans who 
                                                 
20 Cases were identified by reading the results of three Westlaw searches.  To obtain the 
Asian American cases, the SCT-OLD database was searched using the following terms: 
“date(aft 1876) and date(bef 1912) and Chinese or Japanese or Chinaman or Japan or China”.  
To obtain the African American cases, the following searches were used: “Date(aft 1876) and 
date(bef 1912) and ‘civil rights’ ”, and “Date(aft 1876) and date(bef 1912) and ‘Equal 
Protection’ and ‘Fourteenth Amendment’ and African race Negro black”.  The resulting lists 
were checked against cases annotated in the West Supreme Court Digest, topic “Aliens,” 
Key Numbers 19-38; topic “Civil Rights,” Key Numbers 1-17; and topic “Constitutional Law,” 
Key Numbers 214-223.  Any cases not produced in the Westlaw search were examined.  
Finally, any cases not yet identified which were listed in a study of Justice David Brewer’s 
voting patterns were read.  See J. Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v. 
Ferguson: Justice David Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 MISS. L.J. 315, 320-22 (1991).  
21 See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (sustaining 13th Amendment  claim); Franklin 
v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910) (rejecting claim of racial discrimination in selection of 
criminal grand jury); Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909) (rejecting due process claim); 
United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909) (sustaining contempt charge against officials who 
participated in lynching); United States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564 (1909) (rejecting claim that civil 
rights statutes applied to private conduct); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909) (rejecting 
discriminatory jury selection claim); Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452 (1908) (rejecting 
constitutional challenge to state statute); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) 
(rejecting challenge to state educational segregation statute); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 
563 (1906) (upholding civil rights prosecution of state officials); Hodges v. United States, 
203 U.S. 1 (1906) (invalidating civil rights prosecution); Keen v. Keen, 201 U.S. 319 (1906) 
(rejecting equal protection challenge to distribution of estate); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 
(1906) (invalidating removal based on allegation of discrimination in criminal prosecution); 
Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906) (rejecting discriminatory jury selection claim); Riggins v. 
United States, 199 U.S. 547 (1905) (sustaining prosecution under civil rights laws); Clyatt v. 
United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) (rejecting civil rights claim); Selden v. Montague, 194 U.S. 
153 (1904) (rejecting voting claim); Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904) (rejecting voting 
claim); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904) (sustaining discriminatory jury selection claim); 
James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903) (rejecting civil rights claim; statute unconstitutional); 
5
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claimed discrimination in selection of a criminal trial jury or grand jury,22 claimed 
discrimination in their right to vote,23 or were prosecuted for violation of a segregation 
law.24  Other cases raised the question of the application or constitutionality of a civil 
rights statute designed to protect African Americans.25   
 
The second group involved claims advanced by Asian American litigants.26  Some of 
                                                                                                                         
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (rejecting voting claim); Brownfield v. South Carolina, 
189 U.S. 426 (1903) (rejecting grand jury claim); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903) 
(rejecting grand jury claim);  Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900) 
(rejecting challenge to conviction for violation of segregation law); Carter v. Texas, 
177 U.S. 442 (1900) (sustaining discriminatory jury selection claim); Cumming v. Bd. of Educ., 
175 U.S. 528 (1899) (rejecting challenge to segregation conviction); Williams v. Mississippi, 
170 U.S. 213 (1898) (rejecting grand jury discrimination claim); Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (rejecting challenge to segregation conviction); Murray v. Louisiana, 
163 U.S. 101 (1896) (rejecting grand jury claim); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896) 
(rejecting jury selection claim); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896) (rejecting jury 
selection claim); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895) (rejecting voting discrimination claim), 
aff’g 69 F. 852 (4th Cir. 1895); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895) (rejecting equal 
protection claim in criminal case); Wood v. Brush, 140 U.S. 278 (1891) (rejecting jury selection 
claim); Louisville, N.O. & Texas Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890) (rejecting challenge 
to segregation statute); Ex parte Yarborough (The Ku Klux Cases), 110 U.S. 651 (1884) 
(sustaining constitutionality of civil rights laws); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
(invalidating civil rights statutes as unconstitutional); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883) 
(sustaining jury selection challenge); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating 
civil rights statutes); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (rejecting equal protection 
challenge to criminal statute); Dubuclet v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 550 (1880) (rejecting voting 
discrimination claim); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (sustaining jury selection 
challenge); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (sustaining prosecution for violation of civil 
rights laws); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (denying applicability of civil rights laws); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (upholding civil rights statute and claim of 
discriminatory jury selection); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) (invalidating state anti-
discrimination statute). 
22 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (upholding claim of 
discrimination in jury selection). 
23 See, e.g., Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904) (rejecting voting claim).  
24 See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (rejecting equal protection challenge to 
criminal statute). 
25 See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (holding that removal statute did not 
apply to discrimination by actors other than the legislature). 
26  See Goon Shung v. United States, 212 U.S. 566 (1909) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Liu 
Hop Fong v. United States, 209 U.S. 453 (1908) (sustaining immigrant’s claim); Chin Yow v. 
United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) (sustaining immigrant’s claim); Ah Sin v. Wittman, 
198 U.S. 500 (1905) (rejecting discrimination claim by criminal defendant); United States v. Ju 
Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 
(1904) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Tom Hong v. United States, 193 U.S. 517 (1904) 
6
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them raised issues similar to the African American cases, such as discrimination in jury 
selection,27 discriminatory enforcement of the law,28 or the applicability of civil rights 
laws.29  However, many of these cases involved a category of claims which African 
Americans rarely needed to consider: The constitutionality and interpretation of 
immigration laws.30  While the interpretation of these laws does not necessarily raise the 
question of race or discrimination directly, the cases are similar to the Jim Crow cases 
in the following sense: most of the cases involve the interpretation of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act and its progeny, a race-specific statute which was designed to limit non-
white presence and influence in the United States.  
 
The point of analyzing the two groups of cases is to develop a sense of the relative 
sympathy of the justices to the respective claims of each group.  It would be difficult or 
                                                                                                                         
(sustaining immigrant’s claim); Ah How v. United States, 193 U.S. 65 (1904) (rejecting 
immigrant’s claim); Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); 
Chin Ying v. United States, 186 U.S. 202 (1902) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Chin Bak Kan v. 
United States, 186 U.S. 193 (1902) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Lee Lung v. Patterson, 
186 U.S. 168 (1902) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Lee Gon Yung v. United States, 185 U.S. 306 
(1902) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902) 
(rejecting immigrant’s claim); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902) (rejecting 
immigrant’s claim); Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); 
United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459 (1900) (ruling in favor of immigrant); United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (sustaining 14th Amendment claim to citizenship by racial 
Chinese born in the United States); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) 
(sustaining due process claim by criminal defendant); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 
158 U.S. 538 (1895) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 
(1893) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892) 
(sustaining immigrant’s claim); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (rejecting 
immigrant’s claim); Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U.S. 424 (1891) (rejecting immigrant’s 
claim); Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); In re 
Sibuya Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291 (1891) (rejecting claim of discriminatory jury selection); Chinese 
Cases (No. 1), 140 U.S. 676 (1891) (dismissing immigrant’s claims on procedural grounds); 
Chinese Cases (No. 2), 140 U.S. 676 (1891) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); United States v. Jung Ah 
Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888) (sustaining immigrant’s claim); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 
(1887) (invalidating civil rights statute as unconstitutional); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886) (sustaining claim of discriminatory prosecution); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 
(1885) (rejecting claim of discriminatory prosecution); Cheong Ah Moy v. United States, 
113 U.S. 216 (1885) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 
(1884) (sustaining immigrant’s claim); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556 (1883) (rejecting 
criminal defendant’s civil rights argument); Ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U.S. 552 (1883) (same). 
27 See, e.g., Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U.S. 291 (1891). 
28 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
29 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887). 
30 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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impossible to decide which cases were “correctly” decided for our time or for then; 
thus, there is no claim that any individual vote is right or wrong, justly motivated, or 
biased.  The lists of cases were intended to be as inclusive as reasonably possible 
(although no claim is made that all of the cases which reasonably could be included 
were identified).  The lists include short per curiam dispositions, companion cases, 
multiple decisions in the same case, and procedural dispositions.  The lists exclude 
interlocutory procedural orders, and cases which involved racial minorities as parties 
but presented legal issues other than civil rights claims or immigration claims.  
  
A. Harlan and African Americans 
 
The Court decided 45 cases involving African American civil rights during Harlan’s 
service; every one of the 28 justices with whom Harlan served on the Court voted in at 
least one of those cases.  In 11 of those 45 cases (24%), the Court sustained the civil 
rights claim.31  As Appendix 1 shows (Appendices begin on page 648), Harlan’s votes 
in favor of civil rights in 20 of the 44 cases in which he participated give him a pro-civil 
rights percentage of about 45%, well above average, but not even in the top five overall. 
 
Although these numbers may accurately reflect Harlan’s strong sympathy by 
showing him to be almost twice as likely as the Court as a whole to support African 
American civil rights, they may be misleading with respect to other justices because 
they reflect the distorting influence of the fact that all of the other justices served on 
only a subset of Harlan’s cases.  Thus, Justice Hughes’ perfect record in favor of civil 
rights, like Justice Jackson’s perfect record against, is based on a single vote in a single 
case. 
 
Appendix 2 reflects a slightly different analysis: each justice is ranked by the 
percentage of votes they cast in favor of civil rights, whether as part of a majority or in 
dissent, compared to how the majority voted in those cases.  Justice Harlan is first by 
this measure; he was 182% as likely to vote in favor of civil rights as his colleagues.  
Justice Brown is a close second. 
 
These results may be more probative than raw votes, because they show more 
directly the extent to which particular justices deviated from the pack.  Just over one-
half of the justices have scores of 100 because they voted no more and no less 
favorably in the cases on which they sat than did the majority (every one of them 
matched the Court by never dissenting, rather than dissenting for and against civil rights 
in equal numbers of cases).  This analysis probably should not be the last word because 
it is questionable whether the honor of being the justice second most in favor of civil 
                                                 
31 Cases were counted as pro-civil rights if the individual Asian or African American 
prevailed on their constitutional or statutory civil rights argument, if a segregation statute 
was held unconstitutional, if a civil rights statute was held to be constitutional or applicable 
to a particular situation, or if a civil rights prosecution was allowed to proceed.  
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rights can go to Henry Billings Brown, the author of Plessy.  This oddity is explained by 
the fact that the 24 cases Brown sat on were generally not successful for the African 
American litigants--about 10% won, compared to almost 25% for the cases as a whole. 
 Indeed, comparing Brown’s record to Harlan’s on those same 24 cases shows that 
Harlan dissented in favor of civil rights five times to Brown’s two (as well as joining the 
majority the three times it supported civil rights).   
 
Appendix 3 looks at the data another way, ranking the justices by evaluating how 
many of their votes were dissents in favor of civil rights.  By this measure, Harlan is in 
a class by himself; more than one out of five of his votes was a dissent in favor of civil 
rights.  He voted in favor of civil rights in nine cases in which the majority rejected the 
claim.32  
 
There were a total of 16 dissenting votes in favor of the civil rights position in this 
body of cases; nine (56%) were Harlan’s.  By contrast, of the 14 anti-civil rights 
dissenting votes (i.e., dissents where the majority favored the civil rights position) none 
were Harlan’s.   
 
Appendix 4 analyzes the votes another way, comparing the frequency of dissents to 
votes with the majority against civil rights.  Harlan is first by this measure, also. 
 
This analysis also shows that Justices Harlan, Bradley, Day, Brewer, and Brown 
were, compared to the Court as a whole, more likely to vote for African American civil 
rights than the Court as a whole, and that Harlan was the least likely, over the long run 
of cases, to vote against civil rights. 
 
B. Harlan and the Asian American Cases 
                                                 
32 See Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 455 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Court should hear involuntary servitude claim in spite of procedural objection); Berea College 
v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that corporation or natural 
person had right to offer integrated educational program); Hodges v. United States, 
203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress had power to prohibit 
violent interference with African American employment); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 
222 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidence of transportation of African 
Americans from Florida to Georgia to compel them to work was sufficient to present a jury 
question of peonage); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 142 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting 
without opinion); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903) (arguing that federal courts had 
jurisdiction to order state officials to comply with Constitution and register eligible African 
American voters); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that state segregation statute was unconstitutional); Louisville, N.O. & Texas Ry. 
Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that railroad had 
right to offer integrated services); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Congress had power to prohibit discrimination in public 
accommodations). 
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During Harlan’s tenure, the Court handed down 37 decisions involving Asian 
American civil rights.  Only 21 justices participated in the decisions.  African American 
litigants won 24% of their cases; Asian American litigants’ 10 wins gave them a slightly 
better success rate of 27%.  While no justice who voted in more than one case 
supported African Americans more than one-half of the time, Appendix 5 shows that 
Justices Peckham and Brewer consistently supported Asian litigants, voting in their 
favor more than twice as often as the Court as a whole.  Justice Harlan, by contrast, 
was less likely to support Asian civil rights claims than the Court as a whole, ranking 
13th out of 21 justices.  He dissented in three cases, twice against and once in favor of 
civil rights.33 
 
Just as the raw percentages are not fully explanatory in the African American cases, 
here also the wide range of percentages obscures that fact that most justices voted with 
the majority most of the time.  Appendix 6 ranks the justices in order of how likely they 
were to vote in favor of civil rights compared to the majority in the cases in which they 
participated.  Appendix 6 shows that Peckham and Brewer’s high rankings in Appendix 
5 were not anomalous; they supported civil rights for Asian Americans even in cases 
when other justices did not.  By contrast, Justice Harlan was somewhat less likely to 
support civil rights for this group than the Court as a whole.  Given the fact that most 
justices voted with the majority, this puts Harlan fourth from the bottom. 
 
Appendix 6 reflects that fully 14 of the 21 justices who voted in one or more Asian 
American cases were neither more nor less supportive of civil rights than the Court as a 
whole; that is, they had no net dissents in favor or against the civil rights position. 
 
Appendix 7 examines how often a justice dissented in favor of civil rights compared 
to their votes as a whole.  For the top-ranked Justice Peckham, more than one out of 
every two votes was a dissent in favor of Asian civil rights.  Justice Harlan ranks 18th 
out of 21 Justices. 
 
Appendix 8 compares the number of dissents in favor of civil rights to the number 
of votes with the majority rejecting a civil rights claim.  Justice Peckham dissented in 
favor of civil rights more then three times as often as he joined a decision against a civil 
rights claim.  Justice Harlan again ranked 18th out of 21 Justices. 
 
C. Looking at the Numbers 
                                                 
33  See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (Fuller, J., joined by Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that persons of Chinese descent born in the United States were not 
citizens); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 635 (1888) (Harlan., J., dissenting) 
(arguing that statute prohibited Chinese immigrant who lost his papers from entering the 
United States); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 694 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that civil rights statute protecting Chinese was constitutional). 
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The numbers suggest that Harlan was less sympathetic to Asian American civil 
rights than the Court as a whole, and less sympathetic to Asian American civil rights 
than he was to African American civil rights.  Harlan was the clear champion of African 
American civil rights on the Court.  He joined every decision of the Court vindicating 
African American civil rights, and dissented more frequently than any other justice 
when the majority denied them. 
 
With Asian American claims, he has one of the four worst records.  Although the 
Court as a whole ruled for Asian American litigants slightly more often than African 
American litigants (27% versus 24%), Justice Harlan was almost twice as likely to vote 
for the African American civil rights position than the Asian American (45% versus 
25%).   
 
The dissents also tell a stark tale.  Because most justices voted with the majority in 
every case,34 dissents are significant.  Harlan was responsible for more than one-half of 
the dissenting votes in favor of African American civil rights-9 out of 16-and none of 
the 14 votes against African American civil rights in cases where the majority held for 
the individual.  By contrast, Harlan was responsible for 25% of a smaller number (8) of 
dissenting votes against Asian American civil rights, and only one of the 28 dissenting 
votes in favor of Asian American civil rights.  
 
Numerically, Justice Rufus Peckham is the anti-Harlan, strongly supporting Asians, 
slightly less sympathetic than the Court as a whole to claims by African Americans.  
However, there were justices who more systematically supported civil rights.  Justices 
Brewer and Day voted in favor of civil rights more often than the Court with respect to 
both Asian Americans and African Americans. 
 
   There are, of course, alternative interpretations of the data.  It is possible that the 
Court which vindicated about a quarter of the claims advanced by each group was 
wrong and Harlan was right, that the Asian cases were unworthy and the African 
American cases were righteous.  But with dozens of cases in each group, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that the idiosyncracies of individual cases would average out, 
and that Harlan’s record-better than the court’s with respect to African Americans, 
worse than the Court’s with respect to Asians-reflects an actual difference in 
sympathies. 
 
Further, it might be true that Harlan was a strong supporter of civil rights for 
Chinese Americans, just as he was for African Americans, yet had a less favorable 
record than the Court as a whole, if the Court as a whole was extremely favorably 
                                                 
34   Justices Blatchford, Hughes, Hunt, Jackson, Lamar, J., Lurton, Moody, Miller, 
Matthews, Shiras, Strong, Swayne, VanDevanter and Woods joined the majority decision in 
each case from both groups in which they participated.  
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disposed to Chinese American civil rights, at least compared to African American civil 
rights.  However, the Court of the period is perceived by many as giving little respect to 
Chinese American rights.  In sum, the most reasonable interpretation of Harlan’s voting 
record as a whole suggests that he did not support Asian American civil rights as 
strongly as he supported those of African Americans. 
 
II.  EVALUATING CASES BY SIGNIFICANCE. 
 
Part I concluded that Harlan was nearly twice as likely to vote for an African 
American as an Asian American litigant, that no justice dissented more in favor of  
African American litigants, yet only Justice Field dissented more against Asian 
American litigants.  However, that analysis did not look at the content of any particular 
case; the reasons for any vote, or the impact of any decision Harlan joined or rejected.  
Looking at Harlan’s votes in the context of specific cases will offer an additional piece 
of evidence about the extent of his support for Chinese American civil rights. 
 
Starting with Plessy, it is difficult to deny that Harlan’s comments about the Chinese, 
“a race so different,” he said, “from our own,” strike the modern ear as racist.35  
Certainly, Harlan was well aware of the discrimination imposed upon Chinese by the 
national government; they could neither immigrate nor become citizens--disadvantages 
imposed on no other race at that time.  Harlan must also have known that this federal 
discrimination perpetuated a system of disadvantage imposed by the states.  Aliens 
“ineligible to citizenship,” a category that was essentially limited to Asians,36 were 
subject to various legal disabilities, such as prohibitions on entering licensed 
professions37 and owning real property.38 
                                                 
35 See supra  notes 3-5, and accompanying text. 
36 Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1998).  For a description of 
racial discrimination in American naturalization law, see Elizabeth Hull, Naturalization and 
Denaturalization, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 403-24 (Hyung-chan Kim 
ed., 1992).  See also  GABRIEL J. CHIN,  SUMI CHO,  JERRY KANG & FRANK WU, BEYOND 
SELF-INTEREST: ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF JUSTICE 13-17 (1996) 
(describing historical discrimination against Asian Americans), reprinted in 4 UCLA ASIAN 
PAC.-AM. L.J. 129 (1999). 
37 The leading cases on this point are In re Hong Yen Chang, 24 P. 156, 157 (Cal. 1890) and 
In re Takuji Yamashita, 70 P. 482, 483 (Wash. 1902), in which the naturalization proceedings 
undergone by Asian graduates of American law schools were deemed void because Asians 
were racially ineligible for naturalization.  See also  Philip T. Nash, Asian-Americans and Their 
Rights for Employment and Education, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT, 
supra note 36, at 897-908 (discussing statutory discrimination against Asians in employment 
and education). 
38 See Thomas E. Stuen, Asian Americans and their Rights for Land Ownership, in ASIAN 
AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra  note 36, at 603-30 (discussing statutory 
prohibitions on Asian land ownership). 
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However, Harlan’s reaction to disadvantages imposed on Chinese by law was not 
that they should be invalidated according to his color-blindness principle.  In this 
respect, Harlan’s response failed to comport with modern arguments about the 
anti-subordination purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, it did not even 
satisfy the notion of simple formal equality.  Instead, Harlan made what seems to have 
been an early “underinclusiveness” argument similar to that found in modern equal 
protection analysis: the law was irrational because it burdened one despised minority but 
not another, and the one that was not burdened was even more worthy of segregation 
from Caucasians. 
 
Harlan’s vote in United States v. Wong Kim Ark39 was potentially the most damaging 
to the Chinese and other immigrants.  In that case, the Justice Department 
unsuccessfully tested its theory that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment40 did not apply to persons of Chinese racial ancestry born in the United 
States.  Wong Kim Ark, a native San Franciscan, was refused admission to the United 
States upon his return from an overseas visit on the ground that he was not a citizen, 
and could not be admitted as an immigrant because of the Chinese Exclusion Act.41   
 
While the majority held that Wong Kim Ark was a citizen, Harlan agreed with the 
Solicitor General that Chinese could not become citizens simply by being born in the 
United States and that because Chinese were racially ineligible for naturalization,42 there 
were no circumstances under which people with Chinese blood could become 
Americans. 
 
The Justice Department appealed explicitly to race, in addition to legal technicalities: 
 For the most persuasive reasons we have refused citizenship to Chinese subjects; 
and yet, as to their offspring, who are just as obnoxious, and to whom the same 
reasons for exclusion apply with equal force, we are told that we must accept them 
as fellow-citizens, and that, too, because of the mere accident of birth.  There 
certainly should be some honor and dignity in American citizenship that would be 
sacred from the foul and corrupting taint of a debasing alienage. Are Chinese 
children born in this country to share with the descendants of the patriots of the 
American Revolution the exalted qualification of being eligible to the Presidency of 
the nation, conferred by the Constitution in recognition of the importance and 
                                                 
39 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein 
they reside.”). 
41 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 
1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. 
42 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (limiting naturalization to “free white persons”), 
amended by Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (extending naturalization privileges 
to persons of African descent). 
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dignity of citizenship by birth? If so, then verily there has been a most degenerate 
departure from the patriotic ideals of our forefathers; and surely in that case 
American citizenship is not worth having.43 
 
In this case, Justice Harlan should have joined the majority.  In Plessy, he wrote: “[T]he 
recent amendments of the supreme law . . . established universal civil freedom, gave 
citizenship to all born or naturalized in the United States, and residing here, [and] 
obliterated the race line from our systems of governments.”44  Instead, Harlan joined the 
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuller, who concluded that Chinese “cannot become 
citizens nor acquire a permanent home here, no matter what the length of their stay may 
be.”45 
 
Harlan and Fuller relied on racial characterizations of the Chinese, warning of “the 
presence within our territory of large numbers of Chinese laborers, of a distinct race 
and religion, remaining strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, tenaciously 
adhering to the customs and usages of their own country, unfamiliar with our 
institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people.”46  “It is not to be 
admitted,” concluded Harlan and Fuller, “that the children of persons so situated 
become citizens by accident of birth.”47 
 
Harlan joined many decisions of the Court supporting the power of the United States 
to exclude members of particular races because of their perceived defects.   In Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States,48 the Court upheld a ban on Chinese immigration.  The 
Court explained that the Chinese “remained strangers in the land, residing apart by 
themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country.  It seemed 
impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or to make any changes in their 
habits or modes of living.”49  Therefore, exclusion of the Chinese was appropriate: 
 
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and 
encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all 
other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such 
aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its 
national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. . . .  If, 
                                                 
43  See Brief for the United States at 34, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) 
(No. 95-904), reprinted in 14 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 37 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
44 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also  Elk v. 
Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that citizenship clause applies 
to Native American who has severed connections with tribe). 
45 Wong Kim Ark , 169 U.S. at 731 (Fuller, C.J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting). 
46 Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 717 (1893)). 
47 Id. 
48 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
49 Id. at 595. 
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therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative department, 
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not 
assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to 
be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which 
the foreigners are subjects.50 
 
Harlan did not participate in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,51 where a majority of the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute providing that any Chinese person in the 
United States was presumed to be unlawfully present unless he or she could prove 
lawful presence with a federal registration certificate.52  During this period, no other 
aliens were required to register or otherwise prove lawful presence.53  However, 
Harlan’s frequent citation of Fong Yue Ting betrayed no lack of sympathy for its 
reasoning or result.54 
 
Harlan is justly famous for his perceptive appreciation of the situation of African 
Americans and the intent and effect of the laws aimed at them.  His due process 
jurisprudence with respect to Chinese immigrants does not necessarily betray direct 
racism, but it does suggest a wholly different level of sympathy.  In The Japanese 
Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher),55 a would-be Japanese immigrant in exclusion 
proceedings56 claimed that she had been denied due process by the immigration 
authorities.  Harlan agreed that even in immigration proceedings the government could 
                                                 
50 Id. at 606. 
51 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
52 See id. at 728-32. Harlan was in Paris when Fong Yue Ting was argued. See id. at 698 
(noting that case was argued on May 10, 1893); 149 U.S. iii n.1 (“Mr. Justice Harlan, having 
been appointed an Arbitrator on the part of the United States in the Behring Sea Fur-Seal 
arbitration in Paris, heard argument for the last time, this term, on Monday, December 5, 1892, 
and left for Paris soon after.”). 
53 The United States imposed a general registration requirement on all resident aliens only 
in 1940.  See Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (June 28, 1940). 
54 Justice Harlan relied most plainly on the merits of Fong Yue Ting in his opinions in 
Yamataya v. Fisher and Lem Moon Sing.  See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97, 100-01 
(1902) (Harlan, J.) (relying on Fong Yue Ting for principle that race-based exclusion is 
constitutional, and that judicial review of executive action may be sharply curtailed); Lem 
Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 544-46 (1894) (Harlan, J.) (discussing Fong Yue 
Ting at length with approval); see also  La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 
423, 460 (1889) (Harlan, J.) (citing Fong Yue Ting); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 488 (1894) 
(Harlan, J.) (citing Fong Yue Ting). 
55 189 U.S. 86 (1902). 
56 The case was heard in 1903; it took the United States another four years to impose a 
blanket exclusion of Japanese through the so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement.”  See BILL ONG 
HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990, at 
207-12 (1993) (reprinting portions of Gentlemen’s Agreement). 
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not “disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law.’ ”57  Part 
of due process was an “opportunity, at some time, to be heard.”58 Astonishingly, the 
fact that the proceeding was conducted in English, a language unfamiliar to the 
defendant, did not strike Harlan as a constitutional infirmity. 
 
If the appellant’s want of knowledge of the English language put her at some 
disadvantage in the investigation conducted by that officer, that was her misfortune, and 
constitutes no reason, under the acts of Congress, or under any rule of law, for the 
intervention of the court by habeas corpus. We perceive no ground for such 
intervention,-none for the contention that due process of law was denied to appellant.59  
 
Of course, modern courts do not agree that a hearing in an unfamiliar language satisfies 
the requirements of due process of law.60  
 
In United States v. Jung Ah Lung,61 Harlan used his rhetorical powers to criticize the 
majority’s interpretation of a statute that required Chinese residents of the United States 
to produce a government certificate authorizing re-entry after a foreign visit. Because 
Jung Ah Lung’s certificate had been stolen, the majority held that other government 
records could be examined to establish his identity and right to enter.62  Harlan 
disagreed, concluding that only the certificate itself was suffic ient evidence under the 
statute: “If appellee’s certificate was forcibly taken from him by a band of pirates . . . 
that is his misfortune. That fact ought not to defeat what was manifestly the intention 
of the legislative branch of the Government.”63  It is difficult to reconcile this hard-
hearted dissent with the humanitarian evident in portions of the Plessy dissent. 
 
Harlan may have believed that the Chinese were racially unsuited to live in the United 
States.  One piece of evidence-admittedly inconclusive-is the draft argument Harlan 
wrote for his son, James, who was preparing for a debate at Princeton.64  The father 
wrote:  
 
[W]e are not bound, upon any broad principle of humanity, to harm our 
own country in order to benefit the Chinese who may arrive here.... Now, if 
by introduction of Chinese labor we [jeopardize] our own laborers, why not 
                                                 
57 Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100. 
58 Id. at 101. 
59 Id. at 102. 
60 See, e.g., STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 66 (2d ed. 1997); 
THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF, DAVID MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 797 (4th 
ed. 1998). 
61 124 U.S. 621 (1888). 
62 See id. at 634-35. 
63 Id. at 639 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
64 See Letter from Justice Harlan to his son, James (Jan. 21, 1883) (unpublished manuscript, available 
in John Marshall Harlan Papers, Library of Congress). 
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restrict immigration of Chinese. The Chinese are of a different race, as 
distinct from ours as ours is from the negro.... [S]uppose there was a tide of 
immigration ... of uneducated African savages-would we not restrict their 
coming? Would we desist because they are human beings & upon the idea 
that they have a right to better their condition? ... [Chinese] will not 
assimilate to our people. If they come, we must admit them to citizenship, 
then to suffrage--what would become of the country in such a 
contingency.... Under the ten year statute [i.e., the first Chinese Exclusion 
Act] we have an opportunity to test the question whether it is safe to let 
down the bars and permit unrestricted immigration-The Chinese here will, 
in that time, show of what stuff they are made. Our policy is to keep this 
country, distinctively, under American influence.  Only Americans, or 
those who become such by long stay here, understand American 
institutions.65  
 
Conceivably, Harlan’s transcendence in Plessy and failure in the Asian American 
cases can be explained by the nature of the cases.  Most of the Asian American cases 
involved an exercise of power by the national government over immigration; most of 
the African American cases involved state laws or state action.  Of course, the 
Fourteenth Amendment by its terms applies only to the states, and there is no equal 
protection clause in the Fifth Amendment.  Accordingly, Harlan might have reasoned 
that the equal protection clause, and its rationale, bound the states but did not limit 
federal power.  If this explanation is true, then the dissent’s status as an honored text is 
undeserved.  It means that Harlan’s insight was not prejudice, but preemption; if there 
were discrimination to be done, then the federal government, with its much broader 
powers would do it, not the states.   
 
This explanation is refuted by the language of the Plessy dissent.  The dissent does 
not focus on the special obligations of states, or the constitutional limitations imposed 
upon them.  Instead, he seems to argue that denial to African Americas of equal 
treatment is wrong.  But if Harlan is entitled to credit for voting against segregation in 
Plessy because segregation was wrong, it remains a mystery why his anti-
discrimination principle was not uniformly applicable.   
 
Perhaps Harlan’s sympathy for African Americans and lack of sympathy for Asian 
Americans is explained by pragmatic distinctions drawn between Asians and African 
Americans by Congressional opponents of Chinese immigration.  They argued, in 
essence, that African Americans had to be provided for because they were here.  By 
contrast, the Asian problem was still avoidable.66  If this explanation is true, then 
Harlan’s reputation is again undeserved.  This is a weak rationale for equal treatment 
which, even if it had been accepted, would have offered little protection to African 
Americans and none to anyone else.  It would hardly have been a model for enlightened 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 See Chin, supra  note 36, at 33-36. 
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contemporary jurisprudence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Justice Harlan’s voting record is revealing and points in the same direction as other 
evidence of his attitude toward Asian Americans.  In the broad run of cases, the Great 
Dissenter was less likely to vote for As ian American litigants than the Court as a whole, 
and much less likely to do so than he was for African Americans.  Harlan’s negative 
votes in the Asian American cases involved critical civil rights issues.  And to the extent 
that reasons for Harlan’s votes can be discerned, they appear to be motivated not only 
by constraint of “neutral principles” of law, but also by a belief that anti-Chinese policy 
was wise and, perhaps essential.  Again, that Harlan was not perfect certainly does not 
mean that he was not good.  It does mean that the legal doctrine he advanced should be 
regarded as a museum piece, not a blueprint. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Rank of Justices by Percentage of Votes in Favor of Civil Rights, African American 
Cases: 
 
(E.g., 100% of Justice Hughes’ votes supported civil rights) 
 
1. Hughes  100 [1/1] 
2. Lamar, J.   100 [1/1] 
3. VanDevanter     100 [1/1]  
4. Hunt   50  [3/6] 
5. Strong   50 [2/4] 
6. Swayne   50   [2/4] 
7. Bradley   46.15 [6/13] 
8. Harlan   45.45 [20/44] 
9. Woods   42.86 [3/7] 
10. Miller   41.67 [5/12] 
11. Matthews   40 [2/5] 
12. Day   36.36 [8/22]  
13. Blatchford    28.57 [2/7] 
14. Waite   27.27 [3/11] 
Court as a whole:   24.44 [11/45] 
15. Brown   20.83 [5/24]  
16. McKenna   20.83 [5/24] 
17. Brewer   19.35 [6/31] 
18. Holmes   18.18 [4/22]  
19. Clifford   16.67 [1/6] 
20. Gray   16.67 [3/18] 
21. White. E.    15.63 [5/32] 
22. Fuller   15.15 [5/33] 
23. Peckham   14.81 [4/27]  
24. Shiras   10 [1/10] 
25. Field    5.26 [1/19] 
26. Jackson         0.0 [0/1]   
27. Lamar, L.      0.0 [0/2] 
28. Lurton         0.0 [0/1] 
29. Moody         0.0 [0/5]  
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Appendix 2 
 
Rank of Justices by Votes in Favor of African American Civil Rights, as a 
Percentage of Decisions in Favor of Civil Rights by the Majority in Such Cases. 
 
(E.g., Justice Harlan voted in favor of civil rights 20 times, 182% as often as the 11 
times the majority did in the cases upon which he sat.) 
 
1. Harlan  182 [20/11] 
2. Brown  167  [5/3] 
3. Day  160 [8/5] 
4. Brewer  120 [6/5] 
5. Bradley  120 [6/5] 
6. Blatchford  100 [2/2] 
7. Fuller   100 [5/5] 
8. Hughes  100 [1/1] 
9. Hunt  100 [3/3]  
10. Jackson  100 [0/0] 
11. Lamar, J.  100 [1/1] 
12. Lamar, L.  100 [0/0] 
13. Matthews  100 [2/2] 
14. Miller  100 [5/5] 
15. Moody  100 [0/0] 
16. Shiras  100 [1/1] 
17. Strong  100 [2/2] 
18. Swayne  100 [2/2] 
19. VanDevanter 100 [1/1] 
20. Woods  100 [3/3]  
21. McKenna    83 [5/6] 
22. White    83 [5/6] 
23. Peckham    80 [4/5] 
24. Holmes    80 [4/5] 
25. Gray    75 [3/4] 
26. Waite    60 [3/5] 
27. Clifford    33 [1/3] 
28. Field    20 [1/5] 
29. Lurton      0  [0/1] 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/7
1999] THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN BY THE NUMBERS 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Rank of Justices by Frequency of Dissents For (Against) African American Civil 
Rights. 
 
(E.g., one out of every 4.89 of Justice Harlan’s votes was a dissent in favor of African 
American civil rights.) 
 
1. Harlan  1/4.89 [9/44]  
2. Day  1/7.33 [3/22] 
3. Brown  1/12  [2/24] 
4. Bradley  1/13 
5. Brewer  1/31 
Court as a whole: 1/196.5 [393 total votes; 16 dissenting votes for, less 14 
against] 
6. Blatchford  0/7 
7. Fuller  0/33 
8. Hughes  0/1 
9. Hunt  0/7 
10. Jackson  0/1 
11. Lamar, J.  0/1 
12. Lamar, L.  0/2 
13. Matthews  0/5 
14. Miller  0/12 
15. Moody  0/5 
16. Shiras  0/10 
17. Strong  0/4 
18. Swayne  0/4 
19. VanDevanter 0/1 
20. Woods  0/7 
21. White  (1/32) 
22. Peckham  (1/27) 
23. McKenna  (1/24) 
24. Holmes  (1/22) 
25. Gray  (1/18) 
26. Waite  (1/5.5) [2/11] 
27. Field  (1/4.75) [4/19] 
28. Clifford  (1/3) [2/6] 
29. Lurton  (1/1)  
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Appendix 4 
 
Rank of Justices by Frequency of Dissents For (Against) African American Civil 
Rights Compared to Votes with Majority Against Civil Rights 
 
(E.g., Justice Harlan dissented from a majority decision against civil rights once for 
every 2.67  he joined a majority decision against civil rights.) 
 
1. Harlan  1/2.67 [9/24] 
2. Day  1/4.67 [3/14] 
3. Bradley  1/7 
4. Brown  1/9.5  [2/19] 
5. Brewer  1/25 
6. Blatchford  0/5 
7. Fuller  0/28 
8. Hughes  0/0 
9. Hunt  0/3 
10. Jackson  0/1 
11. Lamar, J.  0/0 
12. Lamar, L.  0/2 
13. Matthews  0/3 
14. Miller  0/7 
15. Moody  0/5 
16. Shiras  0/9 
17. Strong  0/2 
18. Swayne  0/2 
19. VanDevanter 0/0 
20. Woods  0/4 
21. White  (1/26) 
22. Peckham  (1/22) 
23. McKenna  (1/18) 
24. Holmes  (1/17) 
25. Gray  (1/14) 
26. Field  (1/3.5) [4/14] 
27. Waite  (1/3) [2/6] 
28. Clifford  (1/1.5) [2/3] 
29. Lurton  (1/0) 
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Appendix 5  
 
Rank of Justices by Percentage of Votes in Favor of Civil Rights, Asian American 
Cases: 
 
(E.g., 84.21% of Justice Peckham’s votes were in favor of Asian American civil 
rights.) 
 
1. Peckham  84.21 [16/19] 
2. Brewer  70.37 [19/27] 
3. Moody  66.67 [2/3] 
4. Day  44.44 [4/9] 
5. Matthews  37.5 [3/8] 
6. Waite  37.5 [3/8] 
7. Holmes  33.33 [3/9] 
8. Gray  30.43 [7/23] 
9. White  30 [6/20] 
10. Blatchford  29.41 [5/17] 
11. Woods  28.57 [2/7] 
12. McKenna  27.78 [5/18] 
Court as a whole 27.03  [10/37]  
13. Harlan  25 [9/36] 
14. Shiras  25 [3/12] 
15. Fuller  24.14 [7/29] 
16. Miller  22.22 [2/9] 
17. Field  21.05 [4/19] 
18. Brown  20 [5/25] 
19. Bradley  13.3 [2/15]  
20. Lamar, L.  11.11 [1/9] 
21. Jackson    0.0 [0/2] 
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Appendix 6 
 
Rank of Justices by Votes in Favor of Asian American Civil Rights as a Percentage 
of Decisions in Favor of Civil Rights by the Majority in Such Cases. 
 
(E.g., Justice Brewer voted in favor of Asian American civil rights 19 times, 317% as 
often as the six times the majority did in the cases upon which he sat.) 
 
1. Brewer  317 [19/6] 
2. Peckham  267 [16/6] 
3. Day  133  [4/3] 
4. Blatchford  100 [5/5] 
5. Brown  100 [5/5] 
6. Fuller  100 [7/7]  
7. Gray  100 [7/7] 
8. Holmes  100 [3/3]  
9. Jackson  100 [0/0] 
10. Matthews  100 [3/3] 
11. McKenna  100 [5/5] 
12. Miller  100 [2/2]  
13. Moody  100 [2/2] 
14. Shiras  100 [3/3] 
15. Waite  100 [3/3] 
16. White  100 [6/6] 
17. Woods  100 [2/2] 
18. Harlan    90 [9/10] 
19. Field    80 [4/5] 
20. Bradley    75 [2/3] 
21. Lamar, L.     50 [½] 
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Appendix 7 
 
Rank of Justices by Frequency of Dissents For (Against) Asian American Civil 
Rights 
 
(E.g., one out of every 1.9 of Justice Peckham’s votes was a dissent in favor of Asian 
American civil rights.) 
 
1. Peckham  1/1.9 [10/19] 
2. Brewer   1/2.08 [13/27] 
3. Day  1/9  
Court as a whole: 1/16.2 [324 total votes; 28 dissenting votes for, less 8 
against] 
4. Blatchford  0/17 
5. Brown  0/25  
6. Fuller  0/29 [one dissenting vote for, less one dissenting vote 
against] 
7. Gray  0/23 
8. Holmes  0/9 
9. Jackson  0/2 
10. Matthews  0/8 
11. McKenna  0/18 
12. Miller  0/9 
13. Moody  0/3 
14. Shiras  0/12 
15. Waite  0/8 
16. White  0/20 
17. Woods  0/7  
18. Harlan  (1/36) [two dissenting votes against, less one dissenting vote 
for] 
19. Field  (1/18) [three dissenting votes against, less two dissenting 
votes for] 
20. Bradley  (1/15) 
21. Lamar, L.  (1/9) 
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Appendix 8 
 
Rank of Justices by Frequency of Dissents For (Against) Asian American Civil 
Rights Compared to Votes with Majority Against Civil Rights. 
 
(E.g., Justice Peckham dissented 3.33 times from a majority decision against Asian 
American  civil rights for every time he joined a majority decision against civil rights.) 
 
1. Peckham  3.33/1 [10/3] 
2. Brewer  1.63/1 [13/8] 
3. Day  1/5 
4. Blatchford  0/12 
5. Brown  0/20 
6. Fuller  0/21 [one dissenting vote against, less one dissenting vote 
for] 
7. Gray  0/16 
8. Holmes  0/6 
9. Jackson  0/2 
10. Matthews  0/5 
11. McKenna  0/13 
12. Miller  0/7 
13. Moody  0/1 
14. Shiras  0/9 
15. Waite  0/5 
16. White  0/14 
17. Woods  0/5 
18. Harlan  (1/25) [two dissenting votes against, less one dissenting vote 
for] 
19. Bradley   (1/12) 
20. Field  (1/12) [three dissenting votes against, less two dissenting 
votes for] 
21. Lamar, L.  (1/7) 
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